Indonesia's Strategy in Southeast Asian Geopolitics

Darmansjah Djumala
Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia
Email: darmansyah.djumala@unpad.ac.id
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0478-8870

Arры Bainus
Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia
Email: arry.bainus@unpad.ac.id
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0489-1037

R. Widya Setiabudi Sumadinata
Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia
Email: w.setiabudi@unpad.ac.id
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0615-2959

Yusa Djuyandi
Department of Political Science, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia
Email: yusa.djuyandi@unpad.ac.id
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4545-1449
Abstract

This article seeks to analyze and characterize the geopolitical structure of Indonesia, the largest archipelagic state globally. It presents two connected primary concepts. First, the geographical characteristics of Indonesia suggest that it may have both strengths and limitations, as well as the potential for social, economic, and even military dominance. Indonesia's geopolitical structure appears to be based on the "strategic trinity" of geostrategy, geoeconomics, and geopolitics. Even though these concepts are not novel in and of themselves, this article contributes to the scant existing literature. The present study contributes by generating new information. It is one of the few studies that evaluate Indonesia's geographical characteristics and how they impact the country's international relations, national defense system, and strategic planning. The study also examines how Indonesia's geopolitical structure may shed light on the nation's renewed interest in Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Indonesia is the most populous nation in Southeast Asia and the world's largest archipelagic state (Jomo, 2019). Indonesia's location between two continents, Asia and Australia, gives it strategic potential and allows it to exert significant influence on international affairs and policymaking (Endiartia, 2021). Indonesia is situated at the "crossroads" of the Australian and Asian continents and the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Fathiraini et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2021). The distance between this particular territory's western and eastern borders is approximately 6,400 kilometers, which is greater than the distance between London and Moscow in the European region (Rochwulaningsih et al., 2019). This expansive territory has resulted in ethnic and cultural diversity and increased regional economic potential. The archipelagic nation of Indonesia is well-known for generating a variety of essential international commodities.

In addition, once the region acquired significance in the global context, it attracted the attention of foreign conquerors. The natural resources and strategic location of Indonesia make it a mighty nation. However, Indonesia's influence in the international community remains diminished. While countries like India and China have focused on ascending power status, Indonesia has lagged and remained a middle power (Rosyidin, 2017).

Geopolitical architecture (G.A.) is how governments manage, access, and formulate the confluence of flows and territories, establishing the boundaries between inside and outside, as well as domestic and international (Ramutsindela et al., 2020). The well-established G.P. field recommends that observers consider the security and political elite's "political, geographical mental maps" instead of solely examining the geographical component of a state's security and international rules.
This study argues that Indonesia’s geopolitical framework should be examined and comprehended for two reasons. First is the strategic significance of Indonesia in the Asia-Pacific region (Wu, 2019). Second, despite studies on Indonesia’s tactical reasoning, international policy, and security system, its geographical characteristics are rarely studied or regarded as a significant explanatory factor. Policy summaries dominate current geopolitical research. Consequently, this study aims to identify and analyze Indonesia’s complex political system by investigating its geographical characteristics and geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic factors.

The current study is founded on two interconnected perspectives. Indonesia’s geographical characteristics may impair and strengthen the world’s largest archipelagic state. This confirms the long-held belief that a state’s geography influences its national security and foreign policy by providing opportunities and constraints. This study also demonstrates how this ubiquitous contradiction between strength and weakness affects military planning, foreign policy, etc.

Second, the article contends that G.S., G.E., and G.P. constitute the "strategic trinity" upon which Indonesia’s G.A. is defined and built. Indonesian G.P. has developed into a mature academic field from a policy practice and concept. This "strategic trinity" argument is not novel in general practice literature (Laksmana, 2011). Nonetheless, it is one of the earliest and most up-to-date attempts to methodically outline and analyze the numerous aspects and consequences of Indonesia’s geographical peculiarities.

The investigation is structured as follows. The following section explains Indonesia’s geographical characteristics as the world’s largest archipelagic state. The researcher evaluates Indonesian G.P.’s theoretical and historical foundations, which have served as a beneficial policy guide for the nation’s ruling class. The research examines the strategic trinity of the Indonesian government and explains how it affects foreign policy and national security.

**Indonesia’s Geographical Traits**

Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) adds 2.8 million square kilometers to the country’s total area, bringing it to 7.9 million square kilometers (Rahman et al., 2021). The nation’s 18,108 islands encompass a total area of 1,826,440 square kilometers (Cribb et al., 2009). For this reason, significant powers have always been drawn to Indonesia and shown a keen interest in its development, as this could alter the regional balance of power (Fatima et al., 2020). Indonesia possesses economic and cultural potential due to its extensive territory, which includes diverse regional prospects. The abundance of its natural resources substantially contributes to the strategic significance of the nation.
Given that Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic nation, administering its numerous islands presents significant challenges. Despite the 1982 "U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)" and two Indonesian government ordinances, the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Indonesia overseas, both within and beyond its archipelagic baselines, remain ambiguous. Indonesia's maritime domain management is complex due to its proximity to ten nations (Fathiraini et al., 2022). Due to its strategic location, Indonesia's primary geographical characteristics are (1) a vast marine domain; (2) the dominance of internal economic, political, and security challenges; and (3) the regional power struggle. Nusantara, the Indonesian word for the archipelago, translates literally to "between the islands" in classical Javanese (Liu et al., 2021).

The geography of Indonesia influences the country's political system in two distinct ways (Wijaya, 2019). If the vast sea area can be effectively governed, it could serve as a political, geographical, economic, security, and social barrier for the nation. This should assist Indonesia in attaining regional leadership and becoming a significant maritime power. Prior research has also emphasized that Indonesia must position itself as the World's Maritime Axis to dispel the notion that being an archipelagic state is disadvantageous and take advantage of the numerous maritime opportunities (Santoso et al., 2017). Its people's cultural, religious, and economic diversity and the complex center-periphery ties between Jakarta and the outlying islands have led Indonesia's leaders to view geography as a national vulnerability (Santoso et al., 2017).

The History and Theoretical Foundations

Before the early twentieth century, when the Dutch colonial government consolidated administrative and territorial control across the region, "Indonesia" (Rabani, 2019) did not refer to a particular geographical area. The Indonesian archipelago consisted of several smaller kingdoms, most of which were "land-based" or continental entities with significantly less physical and geopolitical space. No one is certain about when or how Indonesia began to explore geopolitics. After Japan's surrender in 1945, Indonesia endured a conflict (Dubov, 2021). Dutch attempts to control the territory resulted in the four-year-long War of Independence. Indonesia finally achieved independence from Dutch colonial control (Dubov, 2021). Before the Japanese incursion in World War II, the Dutch military college trained several Indonesian officers. This may have exposed them to influential geopolitical strategists' theories (Doyle et al., 2019).

In August 1945, Muhammad Yamin proposed a "Greater Indonesia". In his presentation, Yamin utilized the term "geopolitics" frequently (Clad et al., 2011). The geopolitics of the cold war brought international attention to Indonesia (Choiruzzad, 2020). Although "geopolitics" is well-known, Indonesian academics and politicians have never developed it systematically into a coherent field of study (Kvangraven, 2021). Instead, "geopolitics" evolved into a political catchphrase and policy topic with
context-dependent, evolving meanings. Still, "geopolitics" remains the foundation for national security and foreign policy (Moisio, 2018). Between 1956 and 1960, Indonesia laid the foundation for its current geopolitical structure, which serves as a national policymaking guide.

It drafted the Law on Indonesian Territorial Waters and Maritime Environment and evaluated the country's Colonial Ordinance from 1939. The sole maritime and territorial border regulation of the Netherlands, the Ordinance of 1939, established its sovereignty three miles from the low-water mark. There were significant security issues in Jakarta. The three-mile bands could not encompass the archipelago because most islands and island clusters are more than six miles apart. Existing literature has also emphasized that Indonesia's security and territorial sovereignty were at risk due to the islands' geographical location. Any incident involving external factors could result in problems in Indonesian waters and political unrest in the region (Butcher et al., 2017). Given these circumstances, the 1957 Djuanda Declaration by Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja annulled the 1939 ordinance one year into the Committee's work. Indonesia's proclaimed first strategy is to unite the archipelago and "shut off" its vast waters (Anwar, 2020). The "Archipelago Doctrine" or "Archipelagic State Concept" it established influenced the country's armed forces for decades. In 1962, Jakarta enacted the Act on Innocent Travel, a rule that regulates maritime conduct and establishes operational conditions for "innocent" marine passage in Indonesian waters. Under President Sukarno's Old Order (1959–1965), the Djuanda Declaration and two bills were never seriously pursued.

President Sukarno prioritized political remarks over policy, and his ideology was not centered on economic and geopolitical content (Fogg, 2020). The military was too fractured by inter-service competition and factionalism for the Cabinet to maintain the Archipelagic Doctrine. As a result of the Archipelagic Doctrine's legal ambiguity under international law, domestic policymakers were lax. This trend reversed during the New Order of President Suharto. The New Order reinstated and clarified the Djuanda Declaration and maritime territorial questions (Wicaksana, 2017). Jakarta invested substantial political and diplomatic capital in marine boundary agreements with neighboring nations and in promoting the Archipelagic State concept in UNCLOS and other forums (Rismana et al., 2021).

The Archipelagic Outlook dominated the nation's geopolitical thinking during the New Order. M. Panggabean, 1982 even described the Archipelagic Outlook as "the geopolitics of Indonesia" in one of his statements. Others believe the outlook exemplifies an "exclusively Indonesian geopolitical concept." In essence, the outlook aimed to bring order to the nation's disorganized topography while integrating land and sea to provide a metaphor that would unite the numerous socioeconomic and political divisions into a single, cohesive organism.
G. S.: the Security and Military Dimensions

After discussing the history of Indonesia's geopolitical foundation, the researcher discusses the G.S., which alludes to the country's political and military presence about its geographical location to demonstrate its power (Anwar, 2020). As the antecedent section shows, under the Unprecedented Order, geopolitical thought reached new conceptual and political heights (Setiawan et al., 2022). In addition, G.P., especially as depicted in the Archipelagic Outlook, fell under the purview of the "strategic arena." Therefore, the initial foundational element of the Indonesian GA is the military security elements (Habibullah et al., 2022). In this regard, the military regards Indonesia's strategic position as the primary source of vulnerability.

Benny Moerdani, a retired armed forces commander, remarked that the threat to the nation's sovereignty does not originate solely in the northern region. The south, east, and west imperiled the Nusantara Archipelago. Paradoxically, Indonesia's position could be a power source and influence if the military could control the marine waterways (Kelanic, 2016). This idea justifies increasing defense expenditures and modernizing the military. In the past, the Navy and air force were explicitly requested to assist the Army. The military and defense strategists prioritize "land-based defense" as long-standing internal security concerns persist.

This would be operationally enacted by dividing the nation into three distinct defense zones: "Zone 1 Buffer Zone", "Zone 2 Primary Defense Zone", and "Zone 3 Resistance Zone N". During all-out guerilla warfare, the Air Force and Navy will control the first two zones, while the Army will play a pivotal position in the 'Strategic Compartments' of the third zone. Some academicians hypothesize that the ancient Javanese concept of Mandala inspired the spatially informed "layered defense." The term "Mandala" is derived from the Sanskrit word for "circle" or "complete" and is used to characterize a miniature representation of the universe. The geometric center of the Mandala circle represents the force that the island of Java means in Javanese thought. Regarding national security and foreign policy, the reasoning suggests that central authority diminishes as one travels from the state's geographic center. Consequently, Java is more susceptible to attacks from geographically nearby nations.

Nonetheless, the initial analysis and forecast of Indonesia's vulnerabilities disclose that, despite considering regional factors, Jakarta still retains the 'enduring relationship between foreign and domestic threats' (Manurung et al., 2021). The concern for the Natuna Islands can explain geostrategy. One facet of Indonesia's relationship with China is geopolitical tension, while the other focuses on geoeconomic cooperation. The conflict over the Natuna Islands' fishing grounds from 2013 to 2016 is the cause of the first factor, geopolitical competition. China's claim stunned the Indonesian military and overlapped with the territory's EEZ.
As a consequence, Indonesia adopted the strategy of stationing its military around Natuna Island so that it would be prepared to confront an enemy force when the time came (Scott, 2019). Marine security issues in Indonesia are a prime example of this complexity. Although the number of pirate events has decreased recently, it has increased over the past decade (see Figure 1).

Table 1: Indonesia’s Threat Outlook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual danger</th>
<th>Potential danger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Global warming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatism</td>
<td>Communications sea Lane violations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
<td>Pandemics</td>
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<td>Managements</td>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horizontal conflicts</td>
<td>Cybercrime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illegal smuggling</td>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy shortage</td>
<td>Foreign hostility</td>
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Figure 1: Indonesian maritime attacks (Source: International Maritime Bureau report)

Indonesia is currently under pressure to prioritize the growing hazards to its marine environment. The traditional threats include security risks exacerbated by the rivalry between the "Great Powers" of the world (Anwar, 2020). In addition, Indonesia is threatened by militarized competition and disputes over marine resources. Other hazards to the
marine ecosystem include piracy, smuggling, unreported fishing, and destruction (Anwar, 2020). Approximately 3,180 foreign fishing vessels are suspected of illegally trawling in Indonesian waters annually (Joni, 2020). This problem is exacerbated by the nation’s dispersed archipelagic nature, incomplete maritime borders, and feeble military. Indonesia's strategic political independence and maritime diplomacy (Santoso et al., 2017) require robust maritime security to protect safety and territorial sovereignty.

The Economic and Resource Aspects of G. E.

Multiple challenges, including political instability and economic development, encompassed the newly independent territory of Indonesia in 1945 when the nation attained its independence. Indonesia is one of Southeast Asia’s largest economies, and its history and culture are complex and diverse. During the first decade of independence, Indonesia relied primarily on land for food and crop production (Booth, 2016). Before the economic crisis of 1997, Indonesia’s economic growth was robust. By 2004, the economy had fully recovered to pre-crisis levels of GDP per capita. Indonesia was required to adapt to a shifting global environment and various political regimes within its borders. Despite shifting dynamics and adjustments, Indonesia’s economy has grown by an average of 5 percent per year since 2000 (Kaszubska, 2017). There were considerable political unpredictability and debt stability concerns until 2004 (Basri et al., 2020). Indonesia’s abundant natural resources relative to its population may appear less than Northeast Asia’s, but they are greater than those of the developing world. Even though the Indonesian economy is not the most resource-intensive in the world, its development has depended mainly on global natural resource growth (Kurniawan et al., 2018). Both offshore mining and fisheries contributed little to the nation’s gross domestic product. The transit speed between islands lagged behind the commerce speed between islands. With Indonesia's rapid economic development and the increasing prominence of maritime-based geopolitical thinking, the importance of the sea has increased over the past four decades. Despite contributing only 2.65% of Indonesia’s GDP in 2019 (SEAFDEC, 2023), the fisheries industry employed approximately 7 million individuals [48]. Additionally, it has been bringing in an increasing quantity of foreign funds. Numerous species of fish, shrimp, turtles, and shellfish, among others, are commercially captured and farmed today.

In addition to its abundance of natural resources, Indonesia is the largest producer of palm oil and the second-largest producer of tin. The territory is also a significant producer of nickel, copper, lignite, and gold, among other materials. The oil and gas industry contributes approximately 12 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (Dolya, 2020); Indonesia’s G.E. benefits from offshore oil and gas exploration. Subsequently, in 1971, Arco opened the Arjuna and Cinta fields in West Java, now the nation’s most famous oil sector and offshore oil extraction began. Offshore oil and gas drilling increased in the Natuna Islands and the waters east of Java. As
production increased in the 2000s, oil, and natural gas became significant sources of revenue (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. State income from Gas and Oil (Adapted from Laksmana (2011))

In 2008, Indonesia had 3.75 billion barrels of oil and 3.185 billion cubic meters of natural gas (Gallagher et al., 2017). Pertamina is responsible for only 21% of natural gas production, while the six largest multinational oil corporations control the remaining 89%. For policymakers, Indonesia’s extreme energy insecurity underscores a further geographical paradox: although the nation is resource-rich, it relies heavily on foreign firms to exploit those resources. As a member of the G20, Indonesia seeks to adopt more pro-investment policies. In addition to these natural advantages, the sea has always played a crucial role in connecting Indonesia to the rest of the world and interconnecting its numerous islands. Illegal fishing in Indonesian waterways has become a more significant problem in recent years (Piesse, 2015). Local estimates place the annual cost of illegal fishing at $3 billion (Chapsos et al., 2019); the territory is severely impacted by unreported and irregular fishing. This argument emphasizes the resources and economy of Indonesia’s GA (Laksmana, 2011).

Geopolitics: The Political and Social Dimensions

Social and political elements, the third component of Indonesia, have internal and external levels. It reflects the separatist and socio-ethnic-religious diversity of the country. Diversity is not the only concern. In 2001, the decentralization of the government and the economy helped reduce the intensity of these conflicts (Hudalah et al., 2022). Many of these newly formed municipal administrations in the regions and outlying islands are ineffective, exacerbating corruption, poverty, unemployment, and economic growth.

There are repercussions for Indonesia’s national and geopolitical security systems. The G.S. explains that policymakers’ strategic environment and strategic thinking are dominated by separatist, terrorism, and subversion concerns (Endiartia, 2021). Thus, many official responses emphasize
social-economic development or repression by security forces. Second, the socio-ethnic and religious diversity of the archipelago justifies the expansion of the Army’s Territorial Command to prevent or suppress internal security threats. This mindset is strengthened by decentralization, which provides political and financial autonomy to regions. Paradoxically, the geographical isolation of the major ethnic groups may aid the nation's ability to function as a "unitary state" by preventing sociocultural conflicts. It has been suggested that Suharto’s New Order created and promoted the concept of marine life to unite and divert these communities from their problems on land. This again demonstrates the geographical and social-political duality of the nation. Archipelagic Outlook and National Resilience by Suharto represent the strategic thinking of Indonesia on this issue. Complementing the Archipelagic Outlook (Laksmana et al., 2018), national resilience envisions a cohesive state economically, politically, militarily, social-culturally, and territorially. Regional resilience, fostered and incorporated into ASEAN procedures and laws, is the total national resilience of several regional countries. It assists them in overcoming obstacles and planning for the future. Suharto’s Archipelagic Outlook and National Resilience describe Indonesia’s strategic outlook.

The second social and political component is foreign policy. This reflects the nation's regional prerogative as the leader of Southeast Asia and its apprehension of potent foreign forces. Anti-colonialism and nationalism have contributed to a climate of mistrust due to the country’s traumatic history with foreign powers. The fact that major powers — Britain, China, the Netherlands, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union — participated in "hostile activities" against the nation has influenced policymakers’ decisions. Indonesia’s foreign policy stance is regarded as "free and active," which indicates its status as a middle power; consequently, Indonesia’s influence on the international system is moderate. As a central power, Indonesia is a moderating influence in international conflicts. There is an urgent need to shift the paradigm to one of more significant global influence (Rosyidin, 2017). Nehru argues that Indonesia still demonstrates reluctance and unwillingness to establish its regional and international influence. Indonesia is not motivated to alter the status quo because its current position in the global and regional order has no adverse effect on its political and strategic status. Therefore, Indonesia wishes to maintain its current strategic alliances. Nevertheless, Indonesia must pursue a higher international level due to its geographical location, affluence of resources, and long history. China and India must serve as a model because they exploited their rich accounts to become significant powers (Rosyidin, 2017).

Given Indonesia's strategic location, policymakers recognize that harmonizing extra-regional forces may be unavoidable (Rosyidin, 2017). This simplifies Indonesia’s support for and participation in ASEAN’s numerous efforts to guarantee freedom from foreign intrusion. Multiple such agreements exist, including the 1971 “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)” and the 1976 “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
These agreements may be supported by a "firm conviction in the balance of power within a multilateral structure." This delicate juggling act is now classified as "dynamic balance" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Implications: from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean?**

"The government determines that the Atlantic Ocean is the past, the Pacific Ocean is the present, and the Indian Ocean is the future" (Scott, 2019). The minister stated that official publications regarding economic policies and governance in the Indian Ocean will be released shortly. These books would describe the prognosis for the nation’s ocean food security. It was believed that Indonesia and India collaborated on Indian Ocean initiatives. This shift in G.P. is subtle but significant. Since approximately 1960, Indonesia’s international norms and integrity elite have prioritized its strategic crossroads position (Shekhar, 2018). But they were primarily concerned with the prized Malacca Straits, which control the region’s economic, military, and power, or the tense South China Sea, which aims to bring China, a regional power, into Indonesia’s front yard in disputes with Indonesia’s closest neighbors over potential energy and tactical waterways.

Surprisingly, India and the Indian Ocean have not been prioritized in the nation’s strategic planning. In the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesia gave the Indian Ocean priority. The absence of prioritization was due to geopolitical rivalries in the Indian Ocean that could affect Southeast Asia. Former adviser to President Suharto, Ali Moertopo, wrote: "Indonesia deplores the growing superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean... [and it] fears that such a rivalry could not only lead to armed conflict but also generate undesirable pressures and demands on riparian and hinterland nations."

The power struggles between critical countries in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean have become the vanguard of a cold war in Asia (Weatherbee, 2019). China’s challenge to the existing order threatens ASEAN, and Indonesia is similarly trapped in the crossfire. Its strategy of Indonesia is to prevent any adverse effects on its economic growth and international reputation. Since the conclusion of the Indochina wars, a politically stable and peaceful regional environment has enabled substantial economic growth and improved living standards. However, the risks of instability are disrupting this environment. ASEAN fears expanding the power dynamic and geostrategic battleground will undermine its position as a central force in the regional security architecture (Weatherbee, 2019). The ASEAN nation in the Indo-Pacific region only desires to increase its geopolitical influence by capitalizing on its strategic location. Indonesia must take the initiative in advancing the new "Indo-Pacific" concept for ASEAN to participate actively in this discourse. As tensions between the United States and China increase, ASEAN must prioritize regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (Anwar, 2020; Weatherbee, 2019). Due to Southeast Asia’s strategic location, the Indonesian government believes that ASEAN must be central to the Indo-
Pacific concept. This is to ensure that a transparent and inclusive Indo-Pacific regional architecture will facilitate robust regional integration and collaboration. Indonesia's interest in the Indo-Pacific will permit the Indonesian government to capitalize on its strategic position between the Indian and Pacific oceans and establish a maritime pivot (Anwar, 2020).

Despite Indonesia's unique relationship with India and the generally positive tone of relations throughout the 1950s, the Indian Ocean Region appears to have been neglected by authorities after the Cold War ended (Aufiya, 2017). In the past two decades, the Indian Ocean has become a crucial strategic region. This is due to the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean as a global trade route, where an estimated 12 percent of ships were traded in 2015. The trade involved more than 2,000 oil tankers (Kaszubska, 2017). Recent terrorism and Islamic extremism in Indonesia have been attributed to populations in Central and South Asia. Some groups were believed to have entered the country through its porous Indian Ocean borders. Illegal immigrants infiltrate Indonesian waterways through the porous northern borders of Sumatra. As piracy increases and the Malacca Straits become more complex, Indonesia and India collaborate on the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Given escalating maritime territorial disputes, economic growth, and energy insecurity, the decline of the United States and Russia and the ascent of China and India indicate the return of great power politics.

Second, on the resource and economic dimension, the emergence of India and China as financial powerhouses during Japan's decline contributed to the G.E. change in the region, affecting Jakarta's economy (Malik, 2014). Instead of India's impact on Indonesia's domestic politics, Indonesia is concerned with the area due to foreign policy and stability on the Western periphery. Indonesia is interested in joining international organizations like the Group of Twenty and the United Nations Security Council as India becomes a regional superpower. This is due to two primary causes. India and Indonesia, the two largest democracies in the region, share many similarities. The second is that Indonesia may take heart from India's global success.

**Conclusion**

Geographically, economically, and globally, there is no doubt that Indonesia is a pivotal state. The present study examined Indonesia's G.A.'s origins and development in depth. In addition, G.S., G.E., and G.P. were discussed and analyzed to provide a comprehensive understanding and strategic implications for Indonesia. The study also examines how these three construction components influence Indonesia's national security, foreign policy, and strategic thinking. In addition, the investigation highlighted Indonesia's location as both a weakness and a strength. Indonesia must recognize its potential and prioritize a more significant role in the international community. The study emphasizes the need for a new paradigm in which the Indonesian archipelago is viewed as an advantage.
To leverage Indonesia’s role in ASEAN, G-20, and other regional and global platforms, it is necessary to focus on geopolitical strategies and understand the significance of geographical position and architecture for foreign policy and military defense.

In addition, the article provided repercussions by demonstrating why and how the Indian Ocean Region is becoming a strategic and foreign policy priority. The strategic reasoning of Indonesia requires further research. As an "extension" of geopolitical strategic thought, the diplomatic and security establishment must also study multilateralism.

References


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