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# Golkar Party and Organisational Involution: Cadre Formation and the Rising of Pragmatism-Transactional Politics in the Golkar Party

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## Abstract

### Key words:

*Organizational  
Involution, Golkar  
Party, Reform,  
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*This article examines the political evolution of the Golkar Party, specifically the succession of party leaders, from its establishment to the Post-Reformation era in 1998. Researchers have discovered a significant phenomenon through the use of historical research methods and careful observation. This phenomenon pertains to the diminishing significance of regeneration, which subsequently leads to the process of involution. Organisational involution refers to the decline in the influence of political parties resulting from a shift in their regenerative processes. This shift is characterised by a departure from fundamental values and party struggles and a focus on the pragmatic interests of emerging elites and cadres. This process has the potential to diminish the influence of the Golkar Party in forthcoming political affairs.*

## Introduction

The Golkar Party (PG) has garnered significant scholarly attention both domestically and internationally due to its extensive political history. Under the monolithic government and political system of the New Order, it exerted significant influence over Indonesian political life for a period exceeding three decades. Numerous studies have generated a substantial body of literature that examines the emergence of this party as a dominant political force during the New Order era ([Suryadinata, 2007](#)). Research has encompassed an examination of the historical, sociological, and ideological origins that contribute to the establishment of a nation-state as a social formation. Since its establishment on October 20, 1964, under the Joint Secretariat of Golkar, the dominant socio-political force of Indonesia has been characterised by its institutional form ([Bahasoan, 1981](#); [Muhaimin, 1982](#); [Pratigny, 1982](#); [Reeve, 2013](#)).

The political studies literature on PG has seen a renewed focus following the political changes in Indonesia that took place after the downfall of Suharto on May 21, 1998. Initially, the party's political dominance waned as new parties emerged as formidable contenders. After the downfall of the New Order in 1998, political power underwent a transformation and evolved into a democratic party that adhered to political rules. [Tomsa \(2008\)](#) demonstrates that the survival of [the subject] in the current context deviates from the expectation that its influence will diminish as a result of political transformations. Tomsa attributes this success primarily to the party leaders' capacity to establish organisational institutionalisations that outperform other parties following Suharto's decline from power. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) emerged during the early stages of political reform in 1998 ([Tomsa, 2008](#)).

According to [Mietzner \(2020\)](#), there has been a decline in the quality of Indonesian politics over the past decade. This decline is characterised by the growing tradition of illiberalism in Indonesian electoral politics, which has had an impact on the ability of old parties to remain relevant in the current political landscape. The text suggests that the decline of democratic values and the emergence of money politics can be attributed to the political environment.

The current literature has gaps in understanding contemporary political dynamics, particularly regarding the influence of identity and money politics. Additionally, there is a lack of research on how political parties fail to develop capable individuals to fulfil organisational roles. This paper examines the development of PG by focusing on the formation of cadres within the organisation and assessing the impact of recent actions on this process. This approach differs from previous studies.

This research will draw upon Xiaobo Lu's (2000) study on the development of the contemporary Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to explore the concept of organisational involution. The concept originated from Clifford Geertz's anthropological research conducted in Indonesia, which examined the adverse impact of Dutch colonialism on the well-being of rural populations. Lu's review examines the political implications of bureaucratization, particularly corruption among party cadres, and how it leads to the loss of original identity and competence within a revolutionary party. Consequently, the party underwent a decline, transforming into a party characterised by patronage-based connections between cadres and party leaders rather than evolving into a rational and contemporary political organisation (Lü, 2000, p. 22).

Lu's examination of organisational involution in his analysis of the CCP offers a thought-provoking perspective that sheds light on a neglected aspect of PG's assessment in Indonesia. There are multiple factors that contribute to the intriguing nature of applying the concept to the study of PG regeneration patterns. The existing literature primarily emphasises the involvement of party elites in the development of political parties. Furthermore, the prevalence of money politics and transactions has drawn attention to the neglect of the party's regeneration process. This paper examines the integration of the regeneration process into the development of PG, specifically focusing on the influence of money politics and transactional practices among party elites on this process.

### **The Party Leadership**

Golkar is a political organisation that embodies Sukarno's belief in the significance of a party that can guide the revolutionary process during the period of independence (Janis, 2012; Wilson, 2013, pp. 62–66). Sukarno's vision of a party that could mobilise all segments of society did not gain traction in the political landscape following independence. This was due to the presence of competing parties with divergent ideologies. The concept of the conception emerged during the mid-1950s and the first half of the 1960s, particularly within functional groups such as civil, military, and professional bureaucracies that were not associated with any political party (Feith, 1963). In response to a succession of political crises during the era of liberal democracy, there was a perceived necessity to establish a political organisation (Wilopo, 1976). Between 1945 and the late 1950s, the government faced challenges in its effective functioning, resulting in the formation of approximately 23 cabinets (Feith, 1964; Tempo Series, 2019). The

establishment of the Joint Secretariat of the Working Group (Sekber Golkar) on October 20, 1964, was a response to a political crisis and aimed to revive Sukarno's old ideas in a new form (Bahasoan, 1981; Janis, 2012; Muhaimin, 1982; Pratignyo, 1982; Reeve, 2013).

Authors frequently interpret this phenomenon as empirical support for the idea of an integralist state, as seen in Golkar's development (Asshiddiqie, 2015; Simanjuntak, 2003). Supomo introduced this concept during the early stages of establishing the independent Republic of Indonesia. Despite concerns about the potential for authoritarianism, Golkar emerged as a significant political entity during the later years of Sukarno's era. It serves as an institutional platform for independent functional groups (Feith, 1963; Razuni et al., 2021). The political constellation during that period consisted of various functional groups, including the bureaucracy, military, workers, farmers, and other social groups not directly involved in the intense political and ideological competition of the 1960s. The concept of work is crucial in representing the impartiality of professionals in various fields and emphasising the importance of their expertise in contributing to society (Reeve, 2013).

Work ideology played a crucial role in the early stages of its inception, serving as a fundamental foundation for development. Golkar is an organisation established with the purpose of implementing ideological principles in the lives of individuals (Razuni et al., 2021). It is noteworthy that, while work ideology emphasises the alignment of goals among various functional groups, its early political development was not devoid of internal political struggles. Pratignyo (1982) demonstrates the power struggle that defines Golkar throughout its historical development until the early stages of the New Order's rise. The support of the civilian bureaucracy ultimately helped the military faction gain more sway within the party, according to historical evidence.

The provided image depicts the composition of Golkar's management during its inception and the period leading up to the 1998 Reformation era. It reveals a notable prevalence of military officers occupying key leadership positions within the Golkar Secretariat. Brigadier General Djuhartono, the inaugural chairman of the Golkar Secretariat, held a significant position as the leader of Golkar during that period. Nevertheless, his strong personal connection with Sukarno greatly enhanced the efficacy of his political endeavours.<sup>1</sup> Following the establishment of the New Order government led by General Suharto, Major General Soeprapto Soekowati was elected to succeed Djuhartono in overseeing the merger of the organisation. Major General Amir Moertono, a long-time acquaintance of Suharto dating back to the era of the Indonesian independence struggle, assumed the position of

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<sup>1</sup> Brigadier General Djuhartono (1925 – 1987) was an army officer who was known as a Sukarno loyalist and became the first General Chair of Golkar. Throughout his career, he is well known for his initiative to form working groups and military cooperation bodies such as Military Workers, Artists, Military Youth, and the Military. However, because of his political loyalty to Sukarno, he became unpopular when the New Order came to power. His political career waned until his death on May 10, 1987.

chairman following the passing of Sukowati in 1972.<sup>2</sup> Moertono introduced a practice within the Golkar leadership where individuals who were perceived as loyal and closely associated with Suharto were appointed. From 1973 to 1983, he served as the leader of Golkar and successfully organised the inaugural Golkar National Conference in 1973. Additionally, during his tenure, the Golkar Secretary underwent a name change to Golkar.

Lieutenant General Soedharmono succeeded Moertono as a replacement during Golkar's National Conference III in 1983. Soedharmono's significant contribution as Chairman of Golkar was his pioneering efforts in establishing the groundwork for the growth and renewal of cadres, going beyond the conventional military and bureaucratic connections inside Golkar (Setjen DPP Golkar, 1988). Soedharmono's success paved the way for young civilian activists and politicians to enter the political arena through the G<sup>3</sup> route, including individuals like Sarwono Kusumaatmadja,<sup>4</sup> Akbar Tanjung,<sup>5</sup> Agung Laksono,<sup>6</sup> and others (Setjen DPP Golkar; 1988). Subsequently, they emerged as significant figures inside the party structure during the reform era when Golkar transitioned into a political party. Lieutenant General Wahono, the former Governor of East Java, succeeded Soedharmono because of the Fourth Golkar National Conference. During Wahono's tenure, Golkar forged a stronger alliance with the military, and the role of Line A, the military representative within Golkar, was reinforced under his guidance.

Following the Golkar National Conference in 1993, when Harmoko, a civilian politician, succeeded Wahono, the late 1990s saw significant changes. Following a four-month stint as Minister of State Special Affairs, Harmoko held the positions of General Chair and Minister of Information for three consecutive terms. He later assumed the role of Chairman of the Indonesian House of Representatives from 1997 to 2002. The political reforms implemented in 1998 signalled a fresh start for Golkar's history. Ir. Akbar Tanjung was elected as the General Chair of the Golkar Party from 1998 to 2003 during the party's Extraordinary National Conference. Subsequently, the party has transitioned into a new phase characterised by shifts in its political leadership, as civilian politicians have assumed prominent roles. These individuals have aligned the party with the prevailing ethos of political reform.

In addition to their professional roles, military officers in prominent positions within Golkar possess noteworthy socio-cultural backgrounds. Drawing on Clifford Geertz's (2013) framework, the high

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<sup>2</sup> Amir Moertono was born in Patihanrowo-Kertosono, Nganjuk Regency, East Java on July 7, 1924. He was a high-ranking military officer who was considered close to Suharto as evidenced by his work during the Dutch Military Aggression I and II 1947 and 1948. As a subordinate of Lieutenant Colonel Suharto at that time, he was tasked with keeping the Suharto family safe throughout the war period. In addition to this closeness, Moertono is also a high-ranking officer who is reliable in the field of the organization. He has experience in the military personnel department, especially in raising general mobilization by the military for West Irian. It became the basis for his ability to organize the masses and it facilitated the victory of Golkar throughout his leadership period (Reeve; 1985).

and middle-ranking officers in the party can be understood as cultural manifestations of the abangan and priyayi classes. The abangan class represents the socio-cultural landscape, while the priyayi class comprises the elite. Similarly, civilian politicians affiliated with the PNI group who transitioned to Golkar during the 1970s predominantly originated from the priyayi social class. Priyayi and Abangan cultures gained dominance during the early 1970s and 1990s (Suryadinata, 1992). According to Harold Crouch, three strategic factors contributed to the success of the Golkar Secretary in the 1971 General Election. First, the former supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party, who possessed an abangan cultural background, sought to demonstrate their loyalty to the New Order regime to protect themselves. Second, there was significant backing from previous PNI supporters in the 1955 elections and the civil bureaucracy, particularly at the regional level, towards the local communities in villages or sub-districts. Third, it is important to consider military operations conducted beyond the island of Java (Crouch, 1982, p. 215).

The Islamic element emerged in its nascent form following the 1971 general election, as there was a growing recognition of the significance of Islamic influence and power. Golkar's leadership has traditionally been dominated by individuals from abangan and priyayi backgrounds. However, starting in the 1970s, the party has made deliberate efforts to incorporate the influence of Islam. The organisation not only establishes and mobilises religious da'wah groups but also recruits young cadres from Islamic student organisations, specifically the Alumni of the Islamic Student Association (HMI) or the Alumni of the Muhammadiyah Student Association.<sup>4</sup> This concept originated during Sudharmono's tenure as Chairman of Golkar. One notable individual recruited among the ranks of HMI alumni was Ir. Akbar Tanjung, who previously served as the General Chair. Sudharmono's policy offers insights into the socio-political Islamization process in Paths A, B, and G. The Islamic-Urban group's influence grew significantly with the addition of young recruits such as Akbar Tanjung, Abdullah Puteh, and Mahadi Sinambela. Path G, representing the societal dimension, encompasses a sociological-Islamic approach to politics. The decision to recruit cadres from HMI activists and Alumni was influenced by HMI's collaborative association with the Army, which emerged due to the leftist influence on campuses during the 1960s (Razuni et al., 2021).

### **Cadre as a Driving Force**

A historical overview of regeneration's development sheds light on its impact on the current development of the party. Contrary to the prevailing perception, regeneration is often seen as a manifestation of the New Order state's corporatization policy. From 1983 to 1988, Sudharmono and Sarwono Kusumaatmadja led efforts to transform the party into a modern organisation through a carefully planned process of regeneration. The architects initially devised a regeneration process utilising a personal, membership-based system for active participation. This initiative

represents a significant advancement in replacing the traditional model of passive party membership with active members from supportive organisations. Since 1983, an initiative has been implemented to establish a membership registration system. This system adopts an active approach and utilises the Golkar Member's Parent Book for membership administration. Prospective members are required to complete the "Form Request to Become a Golkar Member" to obtain a Golkar Member Identification Number.

Sarwono's personal experience of being hired into a cadre served as inspiration for the development of an improved method, as discussed in his interview on September 7, 2021:

*It was 1971, and I didn't think I wanted to be a legislative candidate. I want to be a professional expert. In my heart, can I be chosen? It was because, like most of the Golkar Secretariat figures at the time, including the General Chairperson Soeprapto Soekowati, and Moerdopo, they were very doubtful that the Golkar Secretary could win in the 1971 General Election. I didn't want to. But the security authorities told me to choose. If I want, then the business is with the territorial ruler. But if I don't want to, that means it has to do with intelligence officers. So choose which one said the ruler at the time. Ultimately, I decided to be a legislative candidate, but I didn't think I could be elected. At that time, I had not finished my studies. I only graduated from ITB Civil Engineering in 1974. It turned out that it was the beginning of my long political career through Golkar, and my vehicle for serving the nation and state was consistent in the middle path.*

*(Interview with Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, September 7, 2020)*

Kusumaatmaja's description highlights the state corporatism strategy, which involves assimilating alternative political forces that criticise the regime's rivals into the mainstream. According to Donald Porter's research on the New Order government's attempts to control the influence of Islam, their strategy involved establishing boundaries for acceptable criticism while also maintaining direct state control over political matters (Porter, 2004). Despite the incorporation of recruitment and regeneration into the state's corporatism strategy, the transformation of Golkar into a modern organisation with a structured regeneration process has been a key aspect of its development during that time.

The regeneration system now involves recruitment, evaluation of potential members, cadre education, assignment, and advancement. The materials used for regeneration can be categorised into four types: Basic, Main, Supporting, and Specific Materials. The cadre ranks range from the foundational level to the instructional level. Cadre classification encompasses functional cadres as well as territorial cadres. At the base level, territorial cadres specifically pertain to Village Activator Territorial Cadres. The Working Group through Village Activator Territorial Cadres effectively mobilises Working Groups at the village or sub-district level (Pedomon Induk Kaderisasi; DPP Golkar; 1984).

During that period, the political system operated under the territorial principle of floating-mass politics. The concept entails that the management of political parties, and the Working Group is limited to the Regency or City level. A sub-district commissioner is located within the respective sub-district. An assistant commissioner typically holds a position in a village, sub-district, or comparable administrative unit. Legislative candidates are required to undergo multiple training sessions and possess a minimum of five years of experience on the Central Board. They have also occupied positions in various prominent organisations associated with the Golkar Family, reflecting the values of achievement, commitment, allegiance, and integrity. Cadre Trainers typically undergo Training for Trainers (ToT) prior to regeneration, which involves intensive study materials and an extended duration of education. Over the past decade, they have actively pursued a leadership position within the Golkar Family, as demonstrated by their involvement and responsibilities in various internal organisations. The process of regeneration occurred regularly until the 1998 Extraordinary National Conference, which took place after President Suharto's resignation on May 21, 1998. This event was a significant part of the broader 1998 Reform movement.

The 1998 political reforms resulted in Golkar undergoing transformation into a distinct political party. Despite social pressure against Golkar, the former ruling party under Akbar Tanjung was able to maintain its political influence and remained one of the top three political parties in Indonesia during the early post-Reformation period of 1998. The learning materials underwent several modifications that highlighted the significance of transforming the Group of Work into the Golkar Party. This transformation was later recognised as the New Paradigm of the Golkar Party, as documented in the book titled "The Platform for the Struggle of the Golkar Party" (2004).

### **Merchants and the Problem of Party Cadreization**

Prior to 2004, the regeneration and education of cadres played a crucial role in the development of PG activities. Since 2004, there have been changes in PG's leadership, which have had an impact on PG's cadre practice. One significant development was the rise of Jusuf Kalla, who served as Vice President during the initial phase of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency from 2004 to 2009. Kalla assumed the position of General Chair, succeeding Akbar Tanjung. Kalla's emergence led to a shift in the administration, with an increasing influence of business professionals. His successor, Aburizal Bakrie (2009–2014), was also a prominent conglomerate entrepreneur in Indonesia. Another factor that influences the party's regeneration process is transactional pragmatism politics within the PG body (Razuni et al., 2021).

The presence of entrepreneurs within PG's body is not a recent development. During its early stages, there were pre-existing professional

and functional groups of entrepreneurs. Business groups in Indonesian politics have played significant roles both prior to and following independence (Muhaimin, 1982). The Merchant group comprises indigenous and foreign Eastern groups, including Chinese, Arab, and Indian individuals (Gautama, 1993; IS, Article 163, paragraph 1). These individuals are not only engaged in business activities but also actively support the development of political forces within society. Variations in the degree, frequency, structure, and interaction between entrepreneurs and rulers define the distinction between eras. Muhaimin discussed the interrelationships among merchant groups, their impact, and political affiliations from the early post-independence era until the 1980s (1982). According to Robinson (1986), the prominent business groups in Indonesia are a result of the pseudo-capitalism system implemented during the New Order era. The development of political-bureaucratic families and large conglomerates can be attributed to the marriage between capital and the state bureaucracy. Large conglomerates that emerged during the New Order era typically did not adhere to market principles. Instead, they capitalised on the centralised political patronage system controlled by Suharto, which provided them with advantageous connections (Robinson, 1986).

In contrast to the previous era under the New Order regime, they lacked a position of authority. The PG's emphasis on trading activities distinguished it from the priyayi and abangan groups, which have been influential political forces within the organisation since its inception in the 1960s (Atmosudirdjo, 1983). The transition of leadership from Akbar Tanjung to Jusuf Kalla represents a significant development for a group of entrepreneurs who not only contribute financially to political endeavours but also play a role in overseeing political organisations, such as the PG. Entrepreneurial leadership under Kalla and Bakrie extended beyond the national level to encompass provincial, district, and city levels within PG. Tanjung's study elucidated that the merchant group's predominance within the PG elite, both at the national and regional levels, primarily stemmed from alterations in the party's financial resources following political reform.

During the New Order era, President Suharto and the Golkar Board of Trustees established foundations that financially supported PG. During the post-Reformation era of 1998, the Foundation Law was enacted to prohibit political financing. The government considers it a money-laundering measure. The shift resulted in the business group assuming control of the leadership position within the Golkar Party. They emerged as the most influential faction within the party, exerting significant influence both at the national level and in local areas. The question at hand pertains to the potential impact of these changes on the process of regeneration. The table below presents data on cadre education and training activities during the leadership tenures of Kalla and Bakrie, aiming to provide an overview of this matter (Table 1).

**Table 1:** Education and Training Activities for Golkar Party Central Board Cadres 1998 – August 2022

| Year        | Chairman   | Number of Training   | Description   |
|-------------|--|--|---|
| 1998 – 2004 | Akbar Tanjung  | 6  | It is once-in-a-year training, apart from the orientation activities for the legislative candidates for the House of Representatives;   |
| 2004 – 2009 | Jusuf Kalla  | 2  | Within one period (including orientation of functionaries for legislative candidates for the House of Representatives);   |
| 2009 - 2014 | Aburizal Bakrie  | 1  | Within one period (including orientation of functionaries for legislative candidates for the House of Representatives);   |
| 2014-2016   | The Dualism Era of the Golkar Leadership: Agung Laksono<br>Aburizal Bakrie | -  | -   |
| 2016-2017   | Setya Novanto  | -  | - Facing legal issues October 2017;   |
| 2017-2019   | Airlangga Hartarto   | No time. There is only functionaries' orientation training for the House of Representatives legislative candidates of Five Forces. | Because receiving the abundance of the previous period was so short in time and focused on winning the election;  |
| 2019-2024   | Airlangga Hartarto   | Golkar Institute   | There have been some fundamental changes in the Education and Training of Cadres:- There has been a paradigm shift, not for cadre schools, but professional schools of public policy and government.- There is a general requirement for participants, but the last condition is that participants must pay a large enough school fee for most cadres/members. Those who cannot afford to pay cannot become students.- This education system cannot touch all members/cadres at various levels and levels as an obligation of members and all cadres.- The orientation of the material is more professional, not placing the ideology and history of PG as fundamental; - There is no primary material about Indonesianness: the formation of the nation and its establishment, the process of forming the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the struggle for ideas and agreements by the founders of the country, the birth of Pancasila, the epistemology, ontology, and axiology of Pancasila, along with the founding documents of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, from the founding of the RIS. and the return of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1950, as well as the issuance of a Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959.- Lodging facilities are luxurious; |

**Source:** Analysis from various sources, 2021- August 2022

The table indicates a significant decrease in cadre education and training activities since the change in leadership among entrepreneurs. These activities have historically played a crucial role in strengthening the party, particularly since the implementation of the active system under Sudharmono's leadership. Regeneration during the period of 2004–2009 was limited to Functionary Orientation. Membership recruitment lacks a rigorous selection process and is conducted in a casual manner. Non-members can participate by registering and obtaining a Membership Card. Subsequently, the organisation assumes responsibility for covering the expenses associated with the education and training of the officials during their orientation process.

The material primarily focuses on the fast-paced activities of electoral parties and legislative candidates. However, it is important to note that there is currently no prevailing ideological stance within society. The materials primarily serve the purpose of fulfilling electoral requirements rather than developing ideologically mature, militant, and capable individuals. There is a lack of ideological and primary source material pertaining to political parties, national identity, and Indonesian culture. The information regarding the party's history lacks depth, and the presentation fails to offer a critical perspective that challenges and fosters militancy. The text appears to lack depth and fails to adequately explore the motivations and militancy of the cadres. It reads more like a factual account of events than a comprehensive study that delves into the underlying meanings and values.

Furthermore, the recruitment system exhibits a lack of strictness or rigidity. Newly registered members can promptly engage in the Functionary Orientation activities to pursue candidature for the House of Representatives, even if they have recently completed their Membership Cards and their signatures have not yet dried. Since 2009, the electability of candidates has been based on most votes received by individual electoral candidates under the current open proportional electoral system for Members of the People's Representative Council or Regional People's Legislative Assembly. In practical terms, this electoral system relegates political parties to the role of administrative tools. Once candidates are included in the Permanent Candidate List and become legislative candidates, they typically operate autonomously without requiring coordination with the Regional Leadership Council of the Regency or Municipality, as well as the province. There is no record of House of Representatives candidates from an electoral district attending the office of the Regional Leadership Council of the Regency or City Golkar Party.

Under these circumstances, the electoral political process has shifted from being a contest between political parties to becoming a contest between individual candidates within the same political party, specifically within a given electoral constituency. The complexity of the problem increases for proportional representation systems due to the presence of diverse political forces organising each electoral district. Cadres participate in electoral districts, which have traditionally been strongholds for the

Progressive Party in the regions. Therefore, there will be no conflict regarding ideologies or policies. The conflict primarily revolves around the acquisition of funds to secure electoral support. It is commonly associated with the practice of purchasing and selling votes, facilitated by brokers, regardless of the quantity of votes involved. This situation necessitates the presence of proficient and articulate individuals with strong conceptual and intellectual abilities. What is required is a group of individuals who possess the ability to secure votes through various means, including the practice commonly referred to as vote-buying (Direct Engaging Observations; 2009 and 2019).

## **Conclusions**

The developments in PG after the entrepreneurs' dominance have resulted in notable transformations. Cadres, through their leadership at both national and regional levels, have sociologically and politically shaped PG as a party that primarily attracts political support from middle-class groups with business backgrounds in different locations. The lower class gradually withdrew their support due to the declining backing from nationalist, Islamic traditionalist, priyayi, and abangan activists. It disrupts the emotional and political connection between the ruling party's leadership and the general population. Teachers and middle-class nationalists changed their perception of the Golkar Party, viewing it from a cultural perspective that deviated from Javanese societal values. The demographically most significant voters were in Central Java, Yogyakarta Special Region, and East Java.

The current era of recruitment and regeneration in electoral politics prioritises the financial influence of candidates, leading to the absence of nationalist work groups that were prominent during the initial formation period. This group comprises professional and functional social and community organisations that have been established through a cadre process since the 1970s, facilitated by Kosgoro, MKGR, Soksi, and Gakari, or also the community organisations AMPI, MDI, Satkar Ulama, Al-Hidayah, and HWK were established by Golkar. These organisations are frequently utilised as mere designations for registering as legislative candidates or for other political objectives. These organisations are also facing diminished influence because of a regeneration process that heavily relies on financial resources, intricate business operations, and political favouritism.

This section will conclude by summarising key points regarding the functioning of the regeneration system in Indonesia, considering the changes that have occurred since the 1998 Reformation period. There is a growing number of entrepreneurs who have joined the elite force of PG at both national and regional levels. In conclusion, Golkar has successfully implemented a regeneration system throughout its history, which has played a crucial role in transforming the organisation into a contemporary political party. The New Order regime implemented a control measure in the 1970s and 1980s by recruiting young leaders from outside the bureaucracy and military for regeneration purposes. This measure aimed

to prevent potential resistance in society. The recruitment process has resulted in the emergence of numerous individuals who later played significant roles in Indonesian politics. These leaders were instrumental in transforming Golkar into a modern political party during the early stages of the Reformation era in 1998.

Second, the decline in the practice of regeneration has led to the emergence of entrepreneurs who are supported by business backgrounds and the influence of money politics. The party later intensified the competition among its members for positions as legislative candidates at the national and regional levels. Money became the primary capital for gaining influence, as observed in 2009 and 2019. This scenario does not cultivate statesmen or professional politicians, but instead fosters pragmatic individuals engaged in political endeavours to promote business interests rather than party political objectives and orientations. This picture exemplifies Xiaobo Lu's depiction of organisational involution, wherein individuals joining the Chinese Communist Party primarily seek personal benefits.

Xiaobo Lu demonstrates the correlation between involution and widespread corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in this context. Modern PG exhibits a similar pattern where the predominate role of money reinforces transactional and pragmatic politics. As a result of the power their financial resources wield, cadres emerge and grow. Continued implementation of this process will lead to an organisational revolution within the PG. This involution will pose challenges for the party's future development, as it will result in the reinforcement of de-militantism, the erosion of character, and the promotion of a pragmatic-transactional approach.

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